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Glossary 
 
CIGRE: International Council on Large Electric Systems 
 
ICT: Information and Communication Technologies 
 
SCADA: Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition  
 
TSO: Transmission System Operator 
 
UCTE: the Union for Coordination of  Electricity Transport 
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Executive Summary 
Crucial economic and social functions depend on the security, adequacy, and quality 
of electricity supply. Although it is possible to prevent the most devastating effects of 
electrical service interruptions by resorting to local backup power sources in order to 
ensure continuity and quality of supply, the cost of backup supply systems is 
significant, so that they are generally limited to ensure essential functionalities of the 
dependent service infrastructures for a limited amount of time.  
Overall the vulnerability of the European electrical infrastructure appears to be 
growing due to several factors:  
• demand is steadily growing, and, although this growth may be forecast, it 
cannot be easily faced anytime; 
• after liberalisation, electricity transactions increase and become more hectic, 
and operators tend to operate the whole infrastructure closer to capacity limits;  
• critical infrastructures, and the electrical system primarily,  become highly 
interconnected with other networked systems and the potential for devastating 
effects on vital services can create attractive targets for malicious activity, 
including terrorism.  
Why perform this study on blackouts? In the frame of international action plans to 
enhance the protection of critical infrastructures, energy supply is considered as one 
albeit important infrastructure for the reasons outlined above. Moreover, recent 
blackouts have demonstrated that the cause/effect mechanisms can be of cross border 
nature. The impact of a major failure or a well targeted and successful attack on the 
electrical system (physical as well as presumed cyber attack) could be a major 
regional or national blackout possibly with cross-border ramifications. Therefore, in 
order to better understand vulnerabilities, we start from analysing the mechanisms and 
causes that have lead to recent blackouts. Based on known facts and publicly available 
investigation reports, these blackouts were not caused by malicious attacks but 
nevertheless the current international scene calls for increased vigilance for the 
malicious risk factor [EC 2004].  
In recent years, both Europe and America have experienced a significant number of 
major blackouts. This report specifically focuses on events that affected Europe and 
North America during 2003, namely: 
August 14, 2003  North East blackout over the US and Canada; 
August 28, 2003 - Southern London distribution; 
September 23, 2003 - Danish/Swedish blackout; 
September 28, 2003 - Italian electricity transport grid collapse. 
and provides a detailed analysis by critical comparison, where available, of diverse 
and authoritative information sources. The main information sources used include 
UCTE, Eurelectric, national and international investigation committees like the joint 
US-Canada investigation committee on the North East blackout, the UCTE 
Investigation Committee on the 28 September blackout in Italy, the British, Danish, 
Italian, French, Swedish and Swiss authorities reports, etc). 
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A common pattern that recurs through all the incidents analysed is that a rather trivial 
initiating event, like a tree contact, was compounded by concurrent factors, like 
unavailability of other equipment, thus resulting into a chain of events that ultimately 
led to large and impressive effects  paralysis of wide regions and entire sectors of the 
economy. 
Referring to two of the major events investigated (Italy and American North East), the 
report pinpoints their common roots and the associated critical issues:  
• Current risk assessment methods rely on exhaustive application of the so 
called N-1 criterion to system configuration:  the system must be operated in 
such a way that loss of a single element of the network does not cause 
unmanageable (and thus escalating) disturbances, because the other elements 
could replace the lost function. The N-1 criterion implies that after a first 
incident, measures should be taken as soon as possible to return to normal 
security situation.  Hence load flow analysis is applied exhaustively to single 
loss states in order to evaluate the resulting grid conditions. It is quite apparent 
that these methodologies were not entirely appropriate, in that they did not 
identify security threats in a timely way;  
• The electrical system controls - intended as the procedures for system 
management, and the related information and communication infrastructure, 
comprehensive of monitoring, actuation and protection devices - appear to be 
no longer adequate to cope with the changing nature of transactions. 
Transactions that involve different organisations, nations and thus different 
jurisdictions, current rely on inappropriate procedures and inadequate and/or 
outdated systems. 
 
The electrical system depends substantially and increasingly from its supporting 
information and communication infrastructure, because almost all system vital 
functions are remotely controlled. In this context, the role of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) becomes apparent in at least two ways: 
• Advanced systems for protection, data exchange and situation awareness will 
be deployed, so as  to improve system controls in a way to cope with the 
European energy market drivers.  
• The trend to connect systems to open networks such as the Internet, may 
increase system vulnerability, due both to accidental faults and malicious 
cyber attacks.. 
An increased control systems complexity will in turn require further R&D efforts on 
advanced ICT security technologies. 
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 1 Introduction 
Electricity supply is a key service for modern society. Electric power shows a number of 
key features: 
• it is easy to convert into other energy forms (light; thermal and  
mechanical power , etc.); 
• it is easy and flexible to transport; 
• it may be distributed almost everywhere; 
• it may be generated rather cheaply from primary sources which cannot be 
otherwise utilised (water, lignite, low quality coals, etc.). 
On the contrary, only a rather limited amount of electric energy can be easily stored: 
this involves that, in every time instant, energy demand must be balanced from an 
equal amount of supply, i.e. anytime the exact amount of energy demanded by 
consumers must be produced. When this equilibrium is not respected, the entire 
electrical system enters a critical situation. 
This key feature has two basic outcomes:  
• a transport infrastructure must be built and operated, so as to dispatch 
electricity, i.e. transfer electric power over long distances from generating 
power plants to end users sites, which are distributed on the entire national 
territory. Long distance transport of electricity takes place via a high 
voltage grid, operating at several hundred kV (380 kV on the European 
grid),  while regional and local distribution relies on a sub-network 
operating at progressively decreasing voltage levels (132 kV, 20 kV, 380 
V on the European grid); 
• electricity needs to be dispatched in a safe, reliable and economic way, and 
this involves  a set of  rather complex operating activities so as to match 
power generation capacity with utilisation demand peaks, while ensuring 
electrical system operating security, reliability of supply, and efficient, low 
cost power generation and distribution. 
Also, it must be pointed out that the electrical system depends substantially and 
increasingly from the information and communication  infrastructure, because almost 
all system vital functions are remotely controlled, and remote operation and control of  
distribution and transport grids is based upon an information and communication  
infrastructure. In turn, the information and communication  infrastructure itself  
depends on electrical supply, which creates an interdependency between the two 
infrastructures which further compounds their vulnerability. 
In the current context, threats against the electrical system are growing  like for other 
network- based, highly distributed infrastructures  due to several factors: 
1. demand is steadily growing, and, although this growth may be forecast, 
it cannot be anytime easily faced (also because the public often 
contrasts construction of new power generating plants and transmission 
lines); 
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2. power systems have been developed in the past 50 years so as to ensure 
mutual assistance between national subsystems including common use 
of reserve capacities and, to some extent, to optimise the use of energy 
resources by allowing exchanges between these systems. Todays 
market development with its high level of cross-border exchanges was 
out of the scope of the original system design. Transactions increase, 
following electrical system liberalisation, and this involves operating 
the whole infrastructure closer to security limits;  
3. market liberalisation involves that multiple operators exchange critical 
information so as to jointly operate the system, hence a number of key 
control systems need drastic reviews in order to fit  the operation in a 
market-driven setting; 
4. an increased control systems complexity, required for secure system 
operation,  and their connection to public networks may in turn raise 
system vulnerability, due both to accidental faults and malicious 
attacks;  
5. critical infrastructures, and the electrical system primarily,  are well 
known to be a privileged target in warfare, as well as terrorist attacks. 
Current dramatic developments in the international scenario induce not 
to underestimate the related risk factor. 
In European electrical systems, most information and communication  infrastructures 
currently in use for remote operation and control are still privately owned and 
operated. To some extent this may limit the likelihood and impact of cyber attacks for 
the time being, but in a mid-term perspective the trend towards using open protocols 
and public information and communication infrastructures for automation support 
cannot be avoided,  due to the widespread availability and flexibility of market 
standard solutions, and to the feasibility of value-added customer services they 
provide. Hence, due to economic and political pressures (liberalisation, European 
integration, globalisation, standardisation, reduction of operating costs) adoption of 
open IC infrastructures for electrical system automation will undoubtedly spread  
notwithstanding the exposure to cyber attacks threats. 
The dispatching systems currently in use in most European countries rely on a 
dedicated infrastructure for communication between the national control centre and 
the regional ones, and between those latter centers and the remote data acquisition and 
operation equipment located on power generation facilities and transmission 
substations. Cyber vulnerabilities may result from the fact that system must be 
progressively open to a growing number of operators (competitors in the power 
generation market, control authorities and operating bodies, distribution companies, 
etc.). In that respect, however, predominant threat factors appear related to the 
inherent complexity of the electrical infrastructure, which makes review, redesign, 
and reinstallation of the legacy information and communication  infrastructure for 
monitoring and control also extremely complex, rather than to threats related to 
hostile intrusion introduced by the opening of the system. Energy trade exchange is 
unlikely to introduce in the electrical system further vulnerabilities related to 
information and communication  , as the time horizon of open market transactions 
(market of the day before, adjustment sessions) is such to require access to 
information which may be sensitive regarding operators commercial strategies, but is 
unlikely to be critical for the online operation of the electrical infrastructure and the 
other infrastructures connected. 
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This landscape may change when looking to more peripheral information and 
communication  infrastructures of the electric system, like the ones used for managing 
power distribution of energy supply to the end-user: for instance, on-line customer 
management and administration facilities through remote metering systems entirely 
relies on a public IC infrastructure so as to guarantee openness and interoperability. 
Although data communication relies on sophisticated cryptographic technology,  it is 
obvious that in an open market context, sooner or later those solutions will have to be 
shared among distribution companies, so as to make possible remote metering 
systems interoperability, thus introducing risks related to hostile intrusion by third 
parties.  
However, this report exclusively focuses on progressive establishment of a European 
energy market, and on the threats this may introduce with respect to the core 
governing function of  the electric system, the infrastructure to monitor and control 
energy dispatching. To this aim, we first review vulnerabilities arising from increase 
of cross-border trade per se, and then try to draw lessons from by recent blackout 
events which have pointed out, among other risk factors, the ones related to 
inadequacies of  the IC infrastructure for energy dispatching. 
2 Vulnerabilities of the European electricity transport grid 
In the context of the creation of an internal European electricity market, the existence 
of sufficient cross-border transmission capacities and their efficient utilisation gain 
crucial importance. Historically, transmission system operators (TSOs) have not 
designed the interconnections between their networks primarily to facilitate bulk 
power trade, but rather to achieve better reliability and efficiency of supply through 
co-operation among them. Thus the introduction of open access to transmission 
networks resulted in a number of bottlenecks in cross-border transmission capacity 
which may seriously constrain the establishment of  a European electricity market. In 
the year 2001 the European Commission contracted the Institute of Power Systems 
and Power Economics (IAEW) of the Technical University of Aachen to carry out a 
comprehensive investigation on electricity transmission capacities between the EU 
member states plus Norway and Switzerland, with the main objective of identifying 
bottlenecks in the cross-border transmission systems, and of evaluating ways to 
increase the level of usable cross-border transmission capacity at the critical locations. 
The study [IAEW, 2001] gathered enough data on the frequency and severity of 
congestion to come to a relatively clear distinction between critical and less critical 
bottlenecks. Apart from bottlenecks that can only be relieved by adding new DC 
(direct current) sea cables - a very expensive and long-term measure whose impact 
capacity can be determined very easily  the study identified the following five 
interconnections as critical: 
 
1. France → Spain, 
 
2. France → Belgium & Belgium/Germany 
 
3. Netherlands (to be analysed in combination), Denmark , Germany 
 
4. France/Switzerland/Austria(/Slovenia) → Italy, and  
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5. Norway/Sweden 
 
The results of the study were largely confirmed by subsequent events: all the critical 
regions were hit by congestion crises in the period 2001-2004, although only  some of 
them resulted in significant blackouts. Sweden, Denmark and Italy were the subject of 
major events in 2003, Denmark in 2002 and Spain in 2001 [Eurelectric, 2004b]. The 
congestion area at the Belgian border may appear an exception. However, also this 
area experienced near misses of considerable gravity, since 1998 at least [Electrabel, 
1998].  The main problem there is related to potential cascading line trips between 
Belgium and France (and also between France and Germany) due to thermal 
overloads. When transactions happen between third parties, e.g. France and the 
Netherlands or France and Northern Germany the part of the power that will actually 
flow through the Belgian and Dutch grid strongly depends on the grid topology and 
on the generation pattern in the affected countries. This makes it difficult for a single 
TSO to anticipate the problems. More recently it seems that this risk has become even 
higher, due to the installation of a large amount of wind power in northern Germany. 
When the wind suddenly stops to blow in northern Germany, part of  the deficit is 
compensated by increased generation in France, Spain, etc., a significant part of 
which must flow through the Belgian and Dutch system. 
The annual report 2003 on system adequacy issued by UCTE, the Union for 
Coordination of Electricity Transport, confirms that margins for systems security keep 
eroding. The overall electricity consumption in mainland Europe increased by 3 
percent, while generation capacities slightly improved by 1.6%. In particular, power 
generation from renewable resources went up by 21%. Although the retrospect shows 
sufficient generation capacities, tight situations appeared in several countries during 
the summer. The market development led to a sensible increase in international power 
exchanges of nearly 10% of the overall consumption in Continental Europe. Critical 
levels of congestion were reached in Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and 
Hungary. Consumption increase (+3.1%, +69TWh) was much higher than in the 
previous years (0.6% and 2.4% in 2001 and 2002, respectively) [UCTE, 2004b].   
Italy is the country featuring one of the highest power price levels within the European 
electricity market. Since the Italian market is particularly attractive for traders, 
bottlenecks exist on virtually all of its borders. Concerning power exports from 
Switzerland to Italy, an allocation procedure has been set up, providing for integrated pro-
rata capacity allocations on a yearly basis for both the French and the Swiss borders. 
Although, according to UCTE, there are no realistic limits relating to interconnection 
capacities between Switzerland and France, actual bottlenecks exist due to large 
quantities of power transited from France via Switzerland to Italy. French TSO RTE has 
thus set up an allocation mechanism on a daily basis for imports from France to 
Switzerland. Given the current market situation, it is rarely amazing that a number of 
energy traders intend to boost interconnection capacities into Italy by projecting a number 
of merchant lines [Eurelectric, 2003a]. 
 The UCTE System Adequacy Forecast 2003 - 2005 report [UCTE, 2004c] confirms 
that the situation will not improve in the main UCTE block (i.e, the European 
mainland up to the border with the Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic 
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states), slightly improve in Iberian countries, and worsen considerably in Italy and 
Greece1.  
 
The general industry practice for security assessment has been to use a deterministic 
approach [IEEE/CIGRE, 2004]. The power system is designed and operated to 
withstand a set of contingencies referred to as "normal contingencies" selected on the 
basis that they have a significant likelihood of occurrence. In practice, they are usually 
defined as the loss of any single element in a power system either spontaneously or 
preceded by a single-, double-, or three-phase fault. This is usually referred to as the 
N-1 criterion because it examines the behaviour of an N-component grid following 
the loss of any one of its major components. In addition, loss of load or cascading 
outages may not be allowed for multiple-related outages such as loss of a double-
circuit line.  
In real time, after a contingency, each TSO must return its power system to a N-1 
compliant condition as soon as possible, and in case of a possible delay, must 
immediately inform other TSOs affected [UCTE, 2003] 
 
Power load flow analysis is applied exhaustively to N-1 states in order to evaluate the 
resulting grid conditions. This way the voltages and currents that different parts of the 
power system are exposed to are computed, in order to assess the relevant stresses 
during steady state operation. In most cases, an N-1 state can be sustained for a 
limited amount of time only (typically 10-20), because of the unusual stress on 
certain components, e.g. power lines due to overload start to stretch and tree contacts 
cannot be avoided.  
 
The deterministic approach has served the industry reasonably well in the past, 
resulting in high security levels. Its main limitation, however, is that it treats all 
security-limiting scenarios as having the same risk. It also does not give adequate 
consideration as to how likely or unlikely various contingencies are. This was 
acceptable in the traditional monopolistic industry environment.  In the new 
competitive environment, with a diversity of participants with different business 
interests, the deterministic approach may not be acceptable. There is a need to account 
for the probabilistic nature of system conditions and events, and to quantify and 
manage risk [IEEE/CIGRE, 2004]. 
 
                                                 
1 A major blackout recently affected Attica [CBS News, 2004], whose critical situation had been anticipated quite 
longtime in advance by several concerned parties [Associated Press, 2004].  
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3 Summer 2003 electricity supply disruptions  
The summer of the year 2003 was characterised by electricity supply disruption 
events which had wide impact on a number of  key economies; these events 
contributed to direct attention on how crucially modern  societies depend from correct 
operation of the electric  infrastructure. They also evidenced the extent all 
technological infrastructures depend on  electricity, although most interdependencies 
are not usually perceived not only by the public at large, but neither by most 
infrastructure operators; hence they are not  taken into appropriate account into the 
relevant  contingency planning. The blackouts were concentrated within 6 weeks and  
affected 112 million people in 5 countries [Bialek, 2003]: 
1) August 14, 2003  North East blackout over the US and Canada 
2) August 28, 2003 - Southern London distribution 
3) September 23, 2003 - Danish/Swedish blackout 
4) September 28, 2003 - Italian transport grid collapses. 
In the following we give a short summary of the events and of the programmed supply 
cuts over Italy on June 26,  which to some extent were a precursor of the Italian 
blackout in September. A more detailed analysis of the events is reported in chapter 4. 
 
June 26, 2003 – Programmed supply interruptions over Italy  
In view of a shortage of production against extremely high demand (hot temperature 
and dryness), GRTN, the Italian system operator had to  activate its emergency plan to 
guarantee electrical system security [GRTN, 2003] [AEEG, 2003]. This relies on pre-
programmed supply interruptions for prefixed periods to the interruptible  customers 
and, where this was not sufficient, also to customers at large.  The activation of this 
procedure, which involves leopard skin’ one hour interruptions all over the national 
territory, did  put into evidence how strongly infrastructures are mutually 
interdependent with electricity. Although limited in time and extent, problems were 
recorded to affect automotive transports (green lights were off, galleries lacked 
lighting, fuel service stations could not deliver);  railways; telecommunication, 
financial and sanitary services, public administration; water and food supply.  
 
August 14, 2003 – American North East 
The electric system of Northern Ohio was in a reliable operational state, though being 
operated near prescribed limits, due to moderately high demand to serve air 
conditioning. High imports and unavailability of units depleted the critical voltage 
support.  The event was triggered by a contact between a tree and a 345 kV line (these 
contacts are rather usual and their likelihood increases with power flow due to line 
sagging). 
  
The state estimator used to preview the likely system evolution was out of order for 
approximately 4 hours and was restarted a few minutes before the black-out (both due 
to human errors and to technical problems). Another fault to the SCADA server put 
alarm management out of operation and slowed down the entire SCADA 
functionality, affecting online data update in particular, to the effect of making control 
room  operators quite totally blind to the event. 
The event was in a way  induced and, above all, inappropriately managed 
because of some impending problems affecting the monitoring and control equipment.
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Overloading caused a cascade tripping of several remaining lines. 61,800 MW of load 
were lost at 4 p.m. on August 14; at 8 a.m. the following morning (16 hours later) 
48,800 MW were restored. Hence, some 16,000 MW experienced a longer than 16 
hour outage [Eurelectric, 2004b]. 
The restoration varied between the utilities: 
• Consolidated Edison fully restored service after 29 hours; 
• FirstEnergy restored service to a vast majority of its customers within 36 hours; 
• Long Island Power Authority needed 3 days; 
• Ontario had full service restored at 8 p.m. on Friday, August 22 (8 full days after 
the blackout). 
The event involved loss of 263 power plants (531 individual units) and left 50 million 
customers without power in the US and Canada (unsupplied energy: circa 350,000 
MWh) [Eurelectric, 2004b]. 
The blackout caused huge damage, which was initially estimated to amount 6 billions 
of dollars for the United States only. The impact was amplified by several factors: 
• the US energy transport infrastructure is inadequate with respect to demand. In the 
period 1988-98 energy consumption in the United States was increased by 30%, 
while the transport capacity grew by a 15% only; 
• grid management and operation is entrusted to a large number of operators, what 
hinders the coordination of operations;  
• monitoring and control systems and contingency measures against severe 
disruptions proved to be inadequate. 
The event also revealed how damage caused by supply interruption turned out to be 
far larger than initially estimated, due to growing service dependency from electricity 
supply. Spencer Abraham, the US Energy Secretary supplied an estimate of direct and 
indirect damage to the US economy, in the order of 50 billions of dollars, far larger 
than the initial one.  
 
August 28, 2003 – UK, South London   
A combination of events led to an electricity power supply failure in south London 
that occurred at 18.20 on 28 August. Following an alarm caused by low oil level in a 
shunt reactor, a transformer was disconnected from the distribution system, as it is the 
normal practice in these cases. Unexpectedly, automatic protection equipment 
interpreted the change of power flows, due to the transformer disconnection, as a 
fault, and disconnected 410,000 customers, including parts of London Underground 
and Network Rail. Supply was recovered in half an hour (though the restoration of 
underground operation took longer for safety reasons). 
 [National Grid, 2003] . The event involved the 
loss of 433 MWh supply [Eurelectric, 2004b].  
The cause of the incident was 
the incorrect rating of a protection relay, undiscovered by the extensive quality 
control and commissioning procedures
About 500,000 people were affected by the blackout, including tens of thousands of 
tube passengers stuck in tunnels as trains broke down.  Buildings along the Thames 
were in darkness, 270 sets of traffic lights failed, and train services stopped from four 
mainline stations. The impact of the blackout was compounded by the rush hours time 
which paralysed traffic for several hours after electric power restoration.  
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 September, 23 2003 - Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark   
 
At 12.36 on Tuesday 23 September 2003 Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden 
experienced a comprehensive blackout. The power failure was primarily caused by a 
fault at a substation in Southern Sweden. During a situation with a number of 
interconnectors and power lines in maintenance and four nuclear units out of 
operation, the electric system in Southern Sweden experienced the loss of a large 
nuclear unit. Approximately 5 minutes after the loss of the large nuclear unit, a double 
bus-bar fault in a substation on the West coast disconnected four out of five 400 kV 
transmission lines. Two of the lines provided connection between Central and 
Southern Sweden, while the two others connected two large nuclear units to the grid. 
Increasing flows on the remaining lines and low voltage in Southern Sweden made 
protection relays to trip, and Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark were completely 
disconnected from the Central after 90 seconds [Elkraft, 2003] [Eurelectric, 2004b]. 
The consequences of the fault were so serious that it was not possible to prevent a 
voltage collapse in Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark. A total blackout was the 
result of the voltage collapse, which also caused damage to unit 5 at the largest power 
station on Zealand, Asnæs Power Station.  
Restoration in Denmark was slower than in Sweden, because the black-start facilities 
in the central power plants on Zeeland failed to operate. The 400 kV grid in Southern 
Sweden was restored in about an hour. The recovery of the supply took one to six 
hours in Sweden and Denmark. 
The root cause of the incident was the combination of the initial loss of the large 
nuclear unit with the double bus-bar fault in the substation on the West coast, 
 [Elkraft, 2003]. 
which 
drove the system beyond its security criteria (N-3 situation)
The lost supply was about 10,000 MWh in Sweden and 8,000 MWh in Eastern 
Denmark [Eurelectric, 2004b]. 
 
September 28, 2003 - Italy 
Starting at  3:01 on the night of  September 28, an event originated in Switzerland 
resulted into a blackout which affected the whole of  Italy except Sardinia. Italy was 
importing about a quarter of the domestic consumption (including big pumped storage 
plants) through fifteen transmission lines from France, Switzerland, Slovenia and 
Austria, when a line tripped due to a tree flashover. 
 In twentyfour minutes, a second line tripped, initiating a cascade tripping of all 
transmission lines along the Italian border. In two and a half minutes, Italy went into a 
total blackout. 
After re-connection failed, the 
Swiss grid operator called for a 300 MW decrease in import (in order to return to the 
actually scheduled import), failing to recognise the overloading of the remaining 
lines.
The event took place on Saturday night,  when nearly all productive activities were at 
rest, thus resulting into limited impact on the population and the economy. 
Nevertheless energy restoration required  from 3 to 19 hours, 3-4 hours for the 
northern of Italy  up to 19 hours  for Sicily.,. However, as the blackout took place on a 
Saturday night, in addition to limiting direct damage, also made event management 
simpler by guaranteeing high mobility of  event management  and rescue teams. On 
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both respects, a blackout during a working day might result into a completely 
different scenario. Nevertheless, it was the largest blackout in Europe since ever, at 
least in peace times, comparable in size with the American North East event (about 
170,000 versus 350,000 MWh estimated energy not supplied; 50 million people 
involved). 
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4 Analysis of the Summer 2003 blackouts 
4.1 American North East  
The final report of the joint ad-hoc US-Canada investigation committee on the 
blackout [US-Canada 2004] evidenced the following groups of causes for the event: 
 
Causes of the Blackout’s Initiation 
The Ohio phase of the August 14, 2003, blackout was caused by deficiencies in 
specific practices, equipment, and human decisions by various organizations that 
affected conditions and outcomes that afternoonfor example, insufficient reactive 
power was an issue in the blackout, but it was not a cause in itself. Rather, 
deficiencies in corporate policies, lack of adherence to industry policies, and 
inadequate management of reactive power and voltage caused the blackout, rather 
than the lack of reactive power. There are four groups of causes for the blackout: 
Group 1: FirstEnergy and ECAR failed to assess and understand the inadequacies of 
FE’s system, particularly with respect to voltage instability and the vulnerability of the 
Cleveland-Akron area, and FE did not operate its system with appropriate voltage 
criteria. (Note: This cause was not identified in the Task Forces Interim Report. It is 
based on analysis completed by the investigative team after the publication of the 
Interim Report.) 
A) FE failed to conduct rigorous long-term planning studies of its system, and 
neglected to 
conduct appropriate multiple contingency or extreme condition assessments.  
B) FE did not conduct sufficient voltage analyses for its Ohio control area and used 
operational voltage criteria that did not reflect actual voltage stability conditions and 
needs.  
C) ECAR (FEs reliability council) did not conduct an independent review or analysis 
of FEs voltage criteria and operating needs, thereby allowing FE to use inadequate 
practices without correction.  
D)Some of NERCs planning and operational requirements and standards were 
sufficiently ambiguous that FE could interpret them to include practices that were 
inadequate for reliable system operation.  
 
Group 2: Inadequate situational awareness at FirstEnergy. FE did not recognize or 
understand the deteriorating condition of its system. 
A) FE failed to ensure the security of its transmission system after significant 
unforeseen contingencies because it did not use an effective contingency analysis 
capability on a routine basis.  
B) FE lacked procedures to ensure that its operators were continually aware of the 
functional state of their critical monitoring tools.  
C) FE control center computer support staff and operations staff did not have effective 
internal communications procedures.  
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D) FE lacked procedures to test effectively the functional state of its monitoring tools 
after repairs were made.  
E) FE did not have additional or back-up monitoring tools to understand or visualize 
the status of their transmission system to facilitate its operators understanding of 
transmission system conditions after the failure of their primary monitoring/alarming 
systems.  
 
Group 3: FE failed to manage adequately tree growth in its transmission rights-of-
way. 
This failure was the common cause of the outage of three FE 345-kV transmission 
lines and one 138-kV line.  
 
Group 4: Failure of the interconnected grid’s reliability organizations to provide 
effective real-time diagnostic support. 
A) MISO did not have real-time data from Dayton Power and Lights Stuart-Atlanta 
345-kV line incorporated into its state estimator (a system monitoring tool). This 
precluded MISO from becoming aware of FEs system problems earlier and providing 
diagnostic assistance or direction to FE.  
B) MISOs reliability coordinators were using non-real-time data to support real-time 
flowgate monitoring. This prevented MISO from detecting an N-1 security violation 
in FEs system and from assisting FE in necessaryì relief actions.  
C) MISO lacked an effective way to identify the location and significance of 
transmission line breaker operations reported by their Energy Management System 
(EMS). Such information would have enabled MISO operators to become aware 
earlier of important line outages. 
D) PJM and MISO lacked joint procedures or guidelines on when and how to 
coordinate a security limit violation observed by one of them in the others area due to 
a contingency near their common boundary. 
 
Source:  US-Canada [2004] 
 
In summary, the numerous causes and contributing factors can be grouped into four 
categories: 
1. inadequate management of tree growth in transmission rights-of-way 
2. inadequate situational awareness  
3. inadequate diagnostic support 
4. inadequate system understanding 
Apart from the triggering event, due to 1., the whole deployment of the crisis is 
almost entirely due to 
 In turn, this was the main cause for the inadequate situational awareness at First 
Energy and MISO. 
  when 
concurrent unreported failures both of  FEs supervisory system 
and of the diagnostic equipment (the state estimator) available at MISO, the regional 
TSO.
Failure to provide backup to this equipment can hardly be 
understood in the context of such a complex and hazardous supervisory task
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compared with security standards applied in the energy sector in Europe and to other 
safety critical processes almost everywhere. 
 
4.2 United Kingdom 
In the following we report an excerpt of the National Grid company Investigation 
Report into the incident [National Grid, 2003]: 
Introduction 
A combination of events led to an electricity power supply failure in south London 
that occurred at 18.20 on 28 August. Restoration began at 18.26 and power supplies 
from National Grid were fully restored at 18.57. This report describes the 
circumstances leading to the loss of supply, the steps taken to restore supplies and the 
measures in hand to minimise the risk of a recurrence. 
Transmission System in South London 
The transmission system in south London consists of four substations at Littlebrook, 
Hurst, New Cross and Wimbledon. Normal demands of around 1,100MW are drawn 
by EDF Energy to supply domestic customers and London Underground, together 
with supplies for other large users including NetworkRail. Following the incident 
supplies were lost from Hurst, New Cross and part of Wimbledon. 
Maintenance Activity in the Area 
On 28 August 2003, scheduled maintenance was underway on one circuit from 
Wimbledon to New Cross and one from Littlebrook to Hurst. This level of 
maintenance is usual during the summer months, when demand for electricity is 
generally lower. In line with normal practice, the arrangement of the transmission 
system to accommodate the maintenance had been agreed with the operator of the 
distribution system for the London region, EDF Energy, well in advance, during July 
2002. Routine weekly communication between EDF Energy and National Grid 
resulted in the planned outage at Wimbledon proceeding on 1 July 2003. EDF Energy 
confirmed that it could arrange its distribution system to accommodate this outage 
securely for the maintenance period. 
The First Fault 
The sequence of events started at 18:11. Engineers at the Electricity National Control 
Centre (National Control) received an alarm indicating that a transformer, or its 
associated shunt reactor, at Hurst substation was in distress and could fail, potentially 
with significant safety and environmental impacts. This Buchholz alarm, told 
National Control that gas had accumulated within the oil inside the equipment, which 
can lead to a major failure. National Grid has approximately 1,000 transformers with 
associated equipment connected to its transmission system and on average only 13 
Buchholz alarms are received each year. 
National Control contacted EDF Energy to discuss the Buchholz alarm and asked 
EDF Energy to disconnect the distribution system from the transformer. Then, as is 
normal practice in this situation, National Control initiated a switching sequence to 
disconnect the transformer from the transmission system. This switching sequence 
temporarily left supplies dependent on a single transmission circuit from Wimbledon 
that feeds New Cross and Hurst substations. Under National Grid operating 
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procedures a Buchholz alarm is sufficiently serious to warrant the isolation of 
equipment and reduced security is acceptable for switching time. This is a period of 
time, normally around five to ten minutes, during which the transmission system is 
rearranged, by connecting and disconnecting circuits, so that the affected equipment 
can be taken out of service. 
The switching sequence to remove the transformer began at 18:20, disconnecting 
Hurst substation from Littlebrook substation. This enabled a safe shutdown of the 
transformer which had suffered the alarm, but left Hurst supplied only from 
Wimbledon via New Cross. 
The Second Fault 
Unexpectedly, a few seconds after the switching, the automatic protection equipment 
on the number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross operated, interpreting the 
change of power flows, due to the switching, as a fault. 
The transmission system is extensively fitted with many levels of automatic protection 
equipment, aimed at isolating faults and preventing damage to equipment or even a 
complete shutdown of the transmission system. They measure system characteristics, 
such as voltage and current and, in the event of a fault, will automatically disconnect 
affected equipment. On the National Grid transmission system there are 
approximately 43,000 such pieces of equipment, each with its individual settings to 
meet local requirements. 
The automatic protection relay disconnected the circuit from Wimbledon to New 
Cross. This disconnected New Cross, Hurst and part of Wimbledon from the rest of 
the transmission system, causing the loss of supply. 724MW of supplies were lost, 
amounting to around 20% of total London supplies at that time. This affected around 
410,000 of EDF Energys customers, with supplies being lost to parts of London 
Underground and NetworkRail. 
Restoration 
Restoration actions began at 18:26, re-energising the Hurst substation from 
Littlebrook and then isolating the Wimbledon to New Cross circuit, that had 
automatically disconnected itself, to prevent a recurrence. 
At 18:38 National Control offered to restore supplies to Wimbledon for EDF Energy. 
EDF Energy requested restoration of that supply at 18:48 and restoration was 
completed at 18:51. From this point onwards, London Underground could restore 
electricity to the underground network, when they considered it was safe to do so. 
At 18:41 EDF Energy restored supplies via National Grids Hurst substation to 
approximately one third of the consumers. 
Some 30 switching actions enabled National Grid to restore overall supplies to all 
substations concluding with New Cross at 18:57 which restored the remaining 
supplies for NetworkRail. The substations remained connected to the rest of the 
transmission system via a single circuit until 23:00, the time at which the automatic 
protection equipment that had operated at Wimbledon was successfully isolated. The 
number two circuit from Wimbledon to New Cross was then safely returned to service 
and normal levels of security were restored. A rapid check was made to similar 
automatic protection equipment. 
Source: National Grid [2003] 
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 Although this event cannot really compare with the others because it concerned the 
distribution network rather than the transmission grid, and involved a single operator, 
it shows a common pattern in two respects to the others:  
• the crisis was due to a double fault (N-2). The loss of the transformer required a 
change in power flows which was incorrectly interpreted by an automatic 
protection as a short circuit. This pattern recurs in all the incidents analysed in this 
report; 
• the major effect of the crisis was the blocking of the London tube, with subsequent 
paralysis of the traffic in the whole Greater London, a patent instance of critical 
infrastructures interdependency. Again, this is a common pattern which recurs 
throughout all the incidents analysed. 
 
4.3 Sweden/Denmark   
The key remarks of the Danish operator, Elkraft are reported in their  press release of  
November 11 [Elkraft, 2003]: 
The whole power system must be evaluated both to reduce the risk of extensive 
blackouts in the future and to ensure that voltage is restored sooner after a power cut. 
Those are some of the conclusions in the report that Elkraft System publishes today 
after the power failure on 23 September. Svenska Kraftnät also publishes a report on 
the cause of events today.  
The power failure was primarily caused by a fault at a substation in Southern Sweden. 
The consequences of the fault were so serious that it was not possible to prevent a 
voltage collapse in Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark. A total blackout was the 
result of the voltage collapse, which also caused damage to unit 5 at the largest power 
station on Zealand, Asnæs Power Station.  
 
The last time we experienced a power failure that caused a total blackout on Zealand 
was in 1981, so fortunately, this type of incident is rare, but since such a serious 
power failure has grave consequences for society, we will initiate a number of 
activities to reduce the risk of it happening again and to ensure quicker restoration of 
the power supply than was the case on 23 September - should it happen again in spite 
of everything. 
 
The activities include an evaluation of the East Danish transmission grid to strengthen 
any weak points and an analysis of how the primary power stations in Eastern 
Denmark cope with violent disturbances in the transmission grid. Re-energising the 
East Danish transmission grid from one of the power stations on Zealand after an 
extensive power cut must also be quicker. 
The system operators in the Nordic countries will go through the set of rules 
governing the operation and planning of the Nordic power system to see whether the 
rules need modernisation. 
Finally, the experience gained from the power failure on 23 September will be part of 
the analysis of security of supply initiated by the Danish Energy Authority together 
with the two system operators in Denmark, Elkraft System and Eltra. 
Source: Elkraft, [2003] 
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 On the technical causes of the blackout, the Swedish operator [Svenska Kraftnät, 
2003] further points out that: 
 
The cause of the major black-out was that a very severe grid fault occurred only a few 
minutes after a more ordinary but still most significant fault. The probability of such a 
coincidence is extremely low as the interrelation between the faults in the two 
separate locations was either zero or very weak. The initial fault (loss of a 1250 MW 
generation unit) can be classified to be on the N-1 level according to generally applied 
grid security standards. Any subsequent single N-1 level fault should be managed 
without any external consequences to the supply, provided that 15 minutes are 
available for activation of stand-by reserves if necessary. The fact that the double 
busbar fault, shutting down two major nuclear units and severely reducing the 
transmission capacity, occurred only 5 minutes after the initial loss of generation 
gives that the entire disturbance complex can be classified to be on at least a N-3 
level. This is far beyond the severity degree that the Nordic Power System is designed 
and operated to cope with. Dynamic simulations have been made during the analysis 
process, showing that the system should have managed any arbitrary combinations of 
faults on a N-2 level of severity. 
 
Source: Svenska Kraftnät [2003] 
 
In summary, the Swedish/Danish event is the most technical of the events reported, 
and appears truly due to an exceptional chain of events. Neither the operators, nor 
third parties explicitly blamed lack of preparedness and co-ordination among the 
parties involved, or insufficient exchange of information. 
 
4.4 Italy 
Causes of the blackout 
On the night of 28-29 September 2003 Italy imported about 6900 MW to cope with a 
total demand of 27500 (2200 from France, 3600 from Switzerland, 190 from Austria, 
630 from Slovenia. There were no significant deviations from what the regulators had 
planned. Swiss import was mostly through Canton Ticino: 2360 MW of the total 3600 
were delivered mostly by two 380 kV lines, San Bernardino and Lucomagno 
(Lukmanier), and a 220 kV one, San Gottardo.  The event chain that caused the 
blackout  is acknowledged by the major sources on the event [UCTE, 2004a] [SFOE, 
2004] and [CRE AEEG, 2004] : 
1) Lucomagno line trips due to a tree flashover 
2) 1300 MW are re-routed mostly through the San Bernardino line (110% overload). 
550 MW about are re-routed through France and Slovenia  
3) The Italian operator alerted 10 later reduces import by 300 MW. No overload was 
occurring on the Italian lines.  
4) The Swiss operator tries to reclose the Lucomagno line: impossible because the 
phase angle difference was too high  
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5) All subsequent countermeasures by the Swiss operator are not enough to avoid 
collapse of a second line: San Bernardino trips 24 after the first one due to overload. 
About 10 after San Bernardino line tripping, all Swiss connections are opened by 
distance protections. 
Immediately after the blackout, transmission system operators executives of the five 
involved countries (Austria, France, Italy, Slovenia and Switzerland) met within the 
framework of UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity), 
whose statutory aim is to provide a reliable market base by efficient and secure 
electric "power highways", and decided to set up an independent UCTE Investigation 
Committee that was given the mission to bring a transparent and complete explanation 
of the blackout to the national and European Authorities and to the general 
community.  The Committee conclusions [UCTE, 2004a], are summarised below: 
The operation of the European interconnected electricity system is subject to security 
and reliability standards set within the framework of the UCTE cooperation. A main 
principle underlying these standards is that the system must be operated in such a 
way, that any single incident, for example the loss of a line, should not jeopardize the 
security of the interconnected operation. This is called the N-1 rule. This rule also 
states that in case of loss of N-1 security the system must not only withstand the 
situation, but it is supposed to return to the N-1 secure state as soon as possible to 
resist a possible new event. It implies that countermeasures must be identified and 
prepared at each moment and for each single incident, enabling the system to be 
brought back to a safe state when an incident occurs. Regarding the Italian September 
blackout, The UCTE Committees finding in this respect is that the system was 
complying with the N-1 rule at the time, 
 
ETRANS taking into account 
countermeasures available outside Switzerland. 
The Committee identified four main reasons for the fact that things did not go as 
foreseen: 
1. Unsuccessful re-closing of a first line in Switzerland (Lukmanier) because of a 
too high phase angle difference 
Due to the high loads on the remaining lines, an automatic device, aiming at 
protecting the equipment, blocked according to its design settings the possibility of 
restoring the line back into service. 
2. Lacking a sense of urgency regarding the overload of a second line connecting 
the Swiss system to Italy (San Bernardino) and call for inadequate 
countermeasures in Italy  
The operators were unaware of the fact that the overload was only allowable for about 
15 minutes. A single phone call by ETRANS took place 10 minutes after the trip of 
the first line. ETRANS asked for the imports to be decreased by 300 MW. This 
measure was completed by GRTN within 10 more minutes. Even together with the 
Swiss internal countermeasures, it was insufficient to relieve the overloads. 
3. Angle instability and voltage collapse in Italy  
This was the reason why the Italian system collapsed after its separation from the 
UCTE system. It was not the cause of the origin of the event. 
4. Right-of-way maintenance practice  
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Tree cutting, to maintain safe distances regarding flashover, is subject to national 
regulation (NdA: this is to remark that responsibility over the primary cause of the 
event is stipulated by national regulations which look to be inadequate and/or not 
properly enforced,). 
 
Source: UCTE [2004a] 
 
The regulating Authorities of the countries mostly involved, the Italian Authority for 
Energy and Gas, the French Energy Regulation, and the Swiss Federal Commission 
on Energy initially set up a joint investigation on the Italian event. The investigation 
initially involved also SFOE, the Swiss Federal Office for Energy, which 
subsequently failed, according to [CRE AEEG, 2004], to deliver any information, and 
proposed to  adopt the UCTE report. Also, SFOE proposed to involve the French and 
Italian TSO and the integrated Swiss electricity companies to take part into the 
investigation. AEEG and CRE did not agree with that procedure. Subsequently, SFOE 
unilaterally issued a report on the event [SFOE, 2003], while the Italian and French 
regulatory authorities came to a joint conclusion, reported in [CRE AEEG, 2004].  
 
The Swiss Federal Office report stresses the following points: 
 
It would appear that the main causes of the blackout in Italy were a line to ground 
fault on the Lukmanier line, the inability to restore this line, a phone call between 
ETRANS and GRTN that did not take adequate account of the severity of the 
situation, possible instabilities in the GRTN network, and perhaps insufficient 
distances between conductor cables and trees. 
But these are merely factors that triggered the blackout. The underlying causes of the 
incident that occurred on 28 September 2003 are the unresolved conflicts between the 
trading interests of the involved countries and operators and the technical 
requirements of the existing transnational electricity system. Present-day standards 
and legal instruments are lagging well behind economic realities. 
() 
The blackout indicates the urgency for developing and implementing international 
electricity trading regulations, and for co-ordination among network operators so that 
security and reliability can be assured at all times. All network operators must adapt 
their IT infrastructure and network technology to the latest status of science and 
technology with the aid of corresponding analysis and optimisation programs. 
The binding implementation of recognised principles  such as those laid down by the 
EU in its ordinance on conditions of network access for international electricity 
trading, which was approved on 26 June 2003  is of equal importance  
(…) 
The Swiss Federal Office of Energy recommends proprietors of Swiss transmission 
lines to create a Swiss network operator as an independent operator of the 
transmission network as soon as possible and  without waiting for the introduction of 
legal provisions governing the electricity industry  on a voluntary basis. 
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Switzerland urgently needs a comprehensive federal law governing the electricity 
industry. A consultation process concerning the regulation of the electricity industry 
should take place by the second half of 2004 at the latest  if necessary in the form of 
a conference. 
Switzerland urgently needs a strong regulator who is able to regulate and control the 
market as an equal partner together with regulators of neighbouring countries and the 
EU Commission. This institution is a high priority in view of the urgent need for 
regulation in the areas of crisis prevention and handling. 
 
Source: SFOE [2003] 
 
 
The key results of the Italian and French regulators inquiry are the following [CRE 
AEEG, 2004]:  
 
1. The operators of the Swiss transmission grids, in day ahead planning of the system 
for the 28th of September and in the operations of the night between September 27-
28th, 2003, did not foresee sufficient prevention and preparation measures to 
guarantee the security of grid operation and supply across other power systems in 
Europe; 
 
2. The integrated Swiss electricity companies did not comply with the content of 
UCTE rules during the night of September 28th.  
 
3. During the night of September 27-28th, following the accidental loss of the 
Mettlen-Lavorgo 380 kV line (Lukmanier line) the operators of the Swiss 
transmission grids took inappropriate measures and underestimated the actions that 
should have been requested to other TSOs. These operational mistakes led to the 
consequent loss of the Sils-Soazza 380 kV line (San Bernardino line), and thus to a 
condition of the interconnected grids out of control.  
 
As a consequence they reached the following conclusions: 
 
1. Future UCTE rules should take into account, as improvement, the return of 
experience of these events. Compliance with new rules shall be made legally binding 
and monitored. Independent assessment and control shall be enforced also through the 
function of national regulators. 
 
2. Co-ordination among TSOs shall be reinforced for operational planning and real 
time operation of the interconnected grids. 
 
3. A legal and regulatory framework coherent with European legislation is necessary 
in Switzerland to ensure the security of grid operation and supply in Europe. 
 
Source: CRE AEEG [2004 
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 As mentioned, although advocating a role in the definition of this framework, the 
SFOE report substantially agrees with the tree points above. 
 
Reasons for the Italian system collapse and its protracted restoration   
 
A separate issue from investigation on the reasons why the triggering event chain of 
the blackout was inadequately dealt with, is why the Italian system collapsed, once 
isolated from the UCTE grid, and why restoration was so cumbersome. In its final 
report on the event [AEEG, 2004], the Italian authority for Electricity and Gas 
performs an analysis for what regards the reasons for the Italian system collapse and 
its long restoration:   
 
E4. La mancata adozione delle previste contromisure ha comportato l’inefficacia 
delle 
logiche di controllo delle sezioni critiche poste a difesa dell’integrità della rete di 
interconnessione con l’estero. (Missing adoption of the foreseen (i.e., UCTE) 
countermeasures has resulted in the inefficiency of the control logic of the critical 
sections to defend the integrity of the net in front of cross-border interconnections) 
() 
Il 28 settembre 2003, la mancata adozione delle previste contromisure ha 
determinato lo stabilirsi di eventi verso i quali, le logiche di controllo 
automatiche della sezione critica Rondissone-Albertville e della sezione critica 
Estero, poste a difesa dell’integrità della rete di interconnessione con l’estero, si 
sono rivelate inefficaci. (On September 28, 2003, missing adoption of the foreseen 
countermeasures has determined a chain of events which made ineffective the 
automatic control of the critical section Rondissone-Albertville and of the foreign 
critical section)  
() 
E5. La separazione del sistema elettrico nazionale dalla rete UCTE è stata 
caratterizzata da fenomeni di instabilità transitoria del sistema elettrico italiano 
rispetto alla rete UCTE. (The separation of the national electrical system from the 
UCTE grid has been characterised by phenomena of transient  instability of the Italian 
electrical system with respect to the UCTE grid). 
() 
La diffusione dell’interruzione in Italia (the spread of interruptions in Italy)  
E6. In seguito alla separazione del sistema elettrico nazionale dalla rete UCTE, la 
diffusione dell’interruzione del servizio elettrico nel territorio nazionale è stata 
causata da una serie di eventi concomitanti tra i quali rilevano, primariamente, il 
distacco anticipato di unità di produzione rispetto ai termini prescritti e, in 
seconda battuta, una non efficace reazione del sistema di alleggerimento 
automatico del carico. 
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(As a result of the separation of the national electrical system from the UCTE grid, the 
spread of service interruptions in the national territory has been caused from a series 
of concurrent events:  primarily, the anticipated separation of power generation units 
with respect to the prescribed terms and, second, an ineffective reaction of the load 
separation system)  
In particolare (More specifically:) 
E7. Durante la fase di diffusione dell’interruzione del servizio il comportamento 
di 21 
gruppi di produzione è stato apparentemente difforme da quanto stabilito nelle 
Regole 
tecniche di connessione alla rete di trasmissione nazionale. (During the service 
interruption spread phase the behaviour of 21 power generating groups was patently 
different from what established in the technical Rules of connection to the national 
transmission grid.) 
E8. L’azione complessiva di alleggerimento automatico del carico non ha 
raggiunto i livelli 
previsti nelle Regole tecniche di connessione. Inoltre, è stato riscontrato che un 
certo 
numero di imprese distributrici connesse alla rete di trasmissione nazionale non 
è 
dotate di dispositivi di alleggerimento automatico del carico. (The whole 
automatic load relief action did not comply with the levels established by the technical 
connection Rules. Moreover, several distributors connected with the national 
transmission grid were not equipped with automatic load relief devices)  
 
() 
E9. Il tasso di insuccesso della attuazione delle azioni di rifiuto di carico 12 dei 
gruppi di 
produzione è stato molto elevato. Ciò ha compromesso gravemente il ripristino 
del 
servizio elettrico. (The rate of failure of  the load rejection actions by power 
generating groups was very high . This seriously compromised service restoration)  
() 
E10. Nella maggior parte dei casi non si è verificato l’avvio autonomo delle unità 
di prima riaccensione. Il GRTN ha gestito il ripristino del servizio mediante le 
sole direttici di rialimentazione a partire dal Nord. Ciò ha causato il notevole 
ritardo del ripristino del servizio elettrico nelle regioni del Centro e del Sud. (In 
most cases the independent start of the first blackstart units did not take place. The 
GRTN managed the service restoration only through the lines connecting the North to 
the rest of Italy. This caused the remarkable delay of service restoration in the Center 
and South regions) 
() 
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E11. Durante le fasi di ripristino del servizio elettrico, i sistemi di 
telecomunicazione per il controllo in remoto degli organi di manovra degli 
elementi della rete di trasmissione nazionale hanno subito fenomeni di instabilità 
e saturazione. Inoltre, il sistema di alimentazione in emergenza di detti sistemi di 
telecomunicazione si è rivelato inadeguato. (During the service restoration phases, 
the telecommunication systems for remote control of manoeuvre of components of the 
national transmission elements grid endured phenomena of instability and saturation. 
Moreover, the emergency supply system of the above telecommunication systems 
resulted inadequate.) 
() 
Dalle ore 08:00 alle ore 14:40, non è stato possibile utilizzare il predetto sistema 
di controllo automatico a causa di mancanza di alimentazione (dovuto a non 
adeguatezza dei sistemi di alimentazione di emergenza) dei sistemi di 
telecomunicazione utilizzati a tale fine. Ciò ha comportato la necessità di utilizzo 
del sistema di telecomunicazione satellitare e di attuazione in manuale delle 
manovre necessarie a ripristinare la rete di trasmissione nazionale, inficiando il 
pronto ripristino del servizio. (From hours 08:00 to hours 14:40, it was impossible 
to use the foretold automatic control system because of lack of supply, due to 
inadequacy of the emergency supply systems of the relevant telecommunication 
systems.  This required the use of a backup satellite telecommunication system and to 
manually operate the restoration, thus compromising ready restoration of service). 
 
Source: AEEG [2004 
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Italian system, crucially dependant from power imports,  failed when this import was 
suddenly cut off due to a fault, thus showing a lack of overall security. The system 
5 Conclusions 
 The major incidents summarised, the American NE blackout and the Italian one, 
show a common pattern. The systems have been developed in the past 50 years with a 
view to assure mutual assistance between national subsystems including common use 
of reserve capacities and, to some extent, to optimise the use of energy resources by 
allowing exchanges between them. Todays market development with its high level of 
cross-border exchanges was out of the scope of the original system design. This has 
led the TSOs to operate the system close to its limits reducing the security margins. 
Both blackouts must be seen in this general context. Other similar circumstances 
include:  
• In both situations, neither electrical system management nor operating procedures, 
nor system automation were revised so as to adequately cope with the new 
scenario. In both cases, a rather frequent event (a short circuit between a line and a 
tree) was not timely reported to operators, therefore it was not adequately 
managed and turned out into a disastrous cascade of  failures. This pinpoints the 
inadequacy of the risk assessment methods currently available to operators. Fast, 
on-line security assessment and dynamic security assessment are required. 
• Regarding the Italian case, the UCTE report points out as an accident originated in 
Switzerland did require the timely intervention by the Italian operator to be 
adequately dealt with. However the Italian operator does not have direct visibility 
of events that happen in other countries, and therefore had to be warned on the 
phone from the Swiss operator. 
• The American  system alike lacks a governing body  who may effectively 
coordinate operators activities. Although NERC, the North American electric 
reliability council, did advance a proposal to that effect, this met the opposition of 
several regional operators. Moreover the malfunction of a critical equipment (the 
state estimator), which was supposed to act as a common reference for the 
operators involved in a triggering event, was a key factor in the failure of the 
system, in that it drew in deceit operators on the likely progression of events. 
• In the Italian case, restoration was further compounded by critical infrastructure 
interdependency. After two hours, the emergency supply to several vital 
information and communication equipment ceased to work, hence this equipment 
could no longer operate. This required to resort to a backup satellite facility for 
communication, and to manually operate all the remotely controlled equipment, 
thus making restoration far longer and more cumbersome. 
• In the American case restoration was even longer and more cumbersome, due to 
the inherent complexity and the extension of the crisis, the plethora of actors 
involved, and inadequacies of  automation and support equipment. 
 
A significant feature of the Italian case is that it clearly outlines how the two basic 
attributes of  power service reliability, i.e. adequacy and security,  are somewhat 
contrasting. During the summer crisis of June 26, due to exceptional weather 
conditions, the Italian operator was unable to meet demand requirements (failure to 
provide an adequate service), while the September blackout scenario is one where the 
operator was driven to crucially rely on imports for several reasons, among them the 
pressure from public opinion after the summer crisis, thus operating the system closer 
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system configuration. Load flow analysis is then applied to evaluate the 
resulting grid conditions (this is the measure which was likely unattended by 
to its security limits. Also, the deployment of the Italian crisis is largely due to the 
premature tripping of protection relays, made to protect specific assets, like power 
plants, transformers, and lines: in that case, security in asset protection prevailed over 
adequacy, i.e. caused a total failure to meet demand. 
 
In conclusion, the main issues involved in the events overviewed in this report, and 
namely, in the two key events affecting Italy and the American North East, appear to 
be three: 
 
1. Is reliability of electrical supply diminishing?  If so, what are the socio-economic 
long term causes, or driving forces of this process? And specifically, can 
liberalisation be blamed? In that respect, the authoritative Eurelectric report on 
Power Outages in 2003 [Eurelectric, 2004b] claims that its main finding is that 
liberalisation did not in itself lead to the recent blackouts, although recognising 
that “market liberalisation and the creation of a single European market have 
indeed changed the environment in which a secure electricity supply must 
continue to be ensured. The traditional integrated planning of power generation 
and transmission has disappeared; the European networks, originally designed 
for mutual assistance, are now hosting transit of commercial flows over long 
distances, driving system operators to become more and more inter-dependent, 
while at the same time substantial commercial interests have appeared and the 
number of market actors has significantly increased. These new challenges must 
be duly evaluated, the necessary technical, organisational and functional 
adjustments need to be defined, and appropriate measures must be taken. Also,  
this report acknowledges that “major power outages are viewed by consumers as 
a failure of the whole electricity industry, irrespective of the actual reasons and 
contributing factors. (…) The society will hardly tolerate interruptions in the 
extent of those have occurred since the summer of 2003. The power outage events 
may increase scepticism to liberalisation in citizens, and have already done so in 
some officials both at national and European levels.”  “Most of the existing cross-
border lines connecting in Europe were designed in the past to realise a large 
network improving global safety, socialising reserves and providing mutual 
assistance in case of emergency (generation or grid faults). Today, as the single 
European electricity market is developing, the transmission networks are more 
frequently used for commercial exchange of electricity and thus operated closer to 
their technical limits, whilst their security margins are reduced. This trend is 
encouraged by regulators, who aim at stimulating competition among Member 
States.”  
 
2. Related to the first issue, but worth of a specific focus on its own, there is a 
methodological issue: do we have adequate risk assessment methodologies in the 
electrical sector? The question appears fourfold: 
 
• Risk assessment methods rely on exhaustive application of the N-1 criterion to 
the Swiss operator, while it was probably irrelevant in the US case, where the 
operators were unaware of  the contingency). Moreover, load flow analysis is 
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which appears to be no longer  adequate because: 
a steady-state analysis, which fails to take into account the impact of sudden 
disturbances, and although there exist innovative dynamic assessment 
techniques available, these are not yet applied in the standard operators 
practice. The N-1 security level proved irrelevant as defence in Sweden and 
Denmark, where the combination of contingencies appeared to be at a N-3 
level (the actual security level prior to the events has been estimated from 
simulations to be at N-2 level). Inappropriate application of the N-1 principle 
(i.e. recovering of the normal operation within a certain period of time) 
clearly contributed to the events in the US/Canada and Italy. Although the 
deepening of defence beyond N-1 level (N-2, N-3, etc.) could enhance system 
security, its cost effectiveness is questionable. Already ongoing investigations 
on a more flexible probability-based approach, in addition to the N-1 
principle, should continue; where the duration, profile and consequences of a 
blackout can be taken into account in defining the necessary level of defence.” 
[Eurelectric, 2004b]. 
 
• Many incidents arise from a pattern where the initial fault of a power system is 
compounded by incorrect tripping of protection devices. Although there exist 
risk assessment methodologies for power systems, like load flow analysis, and 
testing/compliance control procedures for automation and protection 
equipment, there is no methodology  for evaluating risks arising from power 
system failures and automation systems altogether. On the contrary, even 
reliability related terminologies  are divergent in the two domains. 
 
• We do not have adequate ways to forecast and assess the socio-economic 
impact of long electricity crises. Different studies, mainly based on customers 
own evaluations, provide widely ranging estimates for the cost of an 
unsupplied kWh. Shorter outages for industrial customers are valued the 
highest levels (e.g. 1,000 /kWh), while long outages (over 24 hours) are put 
by residential customers around 5/kWh, and in cases below 1/kWh. But 
these estimations are to a great extent uncertain; partly due to a lack of 
objective approximation of actually incurred costs, and partly due to the 
difficulties of drawing an appropriate balance between including and 
excluding directly and indirectly associated damages (e.g. a longer outage of 
the London Underground due to safety considerations was a consequence of 
the otherwise short UK event) [Eurelectric, 2004b].  
• Finally, data about frequency, duration and gravity of blackouts are hard to 
compare in Europe, while the US situation had been the subject of 
comprehensive studies by NERC, fully reported for instance in [US-Canada, 
2004],  which shows beyond any doubt that the US situation kept worsening in 
the last 10-15 years. 
 
3. The issue of the electrical system controls (intended as the procedures for system 
management and control, and the related information and communication 
infrastructure, comprehensive of monitoring, actuation and protection devices) 
o alarms are not displayed on the screen of the operators that 
would have to manage them, due to either jurisdictional issues 
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• assess the current situation and timely pinpoint emerging dangers; 
• analyse contingencies and forecast their likely outcomes;  
(Switzerland/Italy);  
o critical equipment is not duplicated so as to remove the effects 
of their malfunction (North America); 
o in both cases the defense plan of the systems failed. Automatic 
protection devices were not able to avoid system collapse. 
Furthermore, in the Italian case, restoration was made long and 
cumbersome due to inadequacies of the supporting information 
and communication infrastructure, as far as emergency supply 
systems are concerned. 
This third issue is intertwined (as an effect) to the first two issues - as shown by 
the role of risk assessment methodologies, both off-line (a-priori) and on-line, in 
that context - but worth again of a specific focus on its own. There is a growing 
consensus about the inadequacy of the European system cybernetics: The lack or 
inadequacy of communication, co-ordination and/or data exchange between 
system operators seems to have played a major role in the escalation of some of 
the examined events. In some cases, there was a lack of sense of urgency, so that 
the designed procedures were not applied. Binding rules for coordination among 
system operators both in normal operation and in other situations are desirable. 
These rules must take account of the new challenges imposed by the liberalisation 
and integration of the European markets (larger cross-border flows, appearance 
of commercial interests, etc.). Tools and means to intensify collection and 
availability of real-time data should be examined and established” [Eurelectric, 
2004b]. TSOs in the UCTE area are still applying non-binding recommendations, 
which were developed before liberalisation (since 1999, a binding System 
Operation Agreement is in force between the NORDEL TSOs; requiring inter alia 
the currently valid security criteria to be observed in daily operations) [ibidem]. 
UCTE proposed an Operation Handbook as a coordinated and updated draft of a 
set of various rules and recommendations set up between the system operators of 
the UCTE countries since the founding of UCPTE in 1951. The Operation 
Handbook will be underpinned by a Multilateral Agreement between the UCTE 
system operators, which is under preparation in parallel with the further drafting 
of the Operation Handbook. This will include adequate data exchange (e.g. the 
appropriate communication channels, data exchange protocols, cryptographic 
scheme, etc.); 
However, once such an agreement is stipulated, a number of issues will require 
further investigation: 
a) enhancement and innovation of protection systems so as to coordinate 
protection intervention over wide areas; the potential role in that respect of 
novel data acquisition and communication equipment, like wide-area 
phasor measurement systems; 
b) systematic approaches to situation awareness so as to allow TSOs to timely 
analyse the huge amount of data generated in anomalous situations and 
appropriately react (all continental Europe is interconnected, hence any 
event, even far away, may have impact on your own system). Proper 
training and decisions support systems will be needed in order to: 
• suggest immediate countermeasures and appropriate recovery actions. 
 32
 6 Bibliography 
 
[AEEG, 2003]  Sintesi dell’Istruttoria Conoscitiva sulle Interruzioni del Servizio 
Elettrico del 26 Giugno 2003, , Autorità per lenergia elettrica e il gas, 6 dicembre 
2003  
http://www.autorita.energia.it/com_stampa/index.htm 
[AEEG, 2004] Resoconto dell’Attività Conoscitiva in Ordine alla Interruzione del 
Servizio Elettrico Verificatasi il Giorno 28 Settembre 2003, Autorità per lenergia 
elettrica e il gas, 9 giugno 2004 http://www.autorita.energia.it/com_stampa/index.htm 
[Associated Press, 2004] Greek official warns of blackout during Olympics, 
Associated Press  dated: Tue. Jul. 13 2004 9:50 PM ET , reported in: 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/print/CTVNews/1089728549668_85137749/?
hub=World&subhub=PrintStory 
[Bialek, 2003] Recent blackouts in US, UK, Scandinavia and Italy: is it contagious? 
J.Bialek, Univ. of Edinburgh, 2003 
www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/news/autumn03/bialek.pdf  
[CBS News, 2004] Greek Power Outage Probed Athens, August 19, 2004 4:28pm 
ET, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/13/world/main629480.shtml 
[CRE AEEG, 2004] The joint conclusions of the inquiry of the Italien and French 
regulatory authorities on the international causes of the September black out. Press 
release dated 04/23/04 
http://www.cre.fr/uk/ressources/communiquesdepresse/communiquesdepresse_consul
tation.jsp?idDoc=1864 
[EC 2004] Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism, 
Brussels, 27 September 2004, COM (2004) Rev 1 
[Elkraft, 2003] Press release: Effects of power failures must be reduced. Elkraft, 
November 4, 2003, http://www.elkraft-system.dk/  
[Electrabl, 1998] A critical situation in a normal power system. ELECTRABEL PLANIFICATION & 
TRANSPORT, CRT Centre, Note dated 18/08/98. 
[Eurelectric, 2003a] Internal Electricity Market and External Trade in Electricity, 
EURELECTRIC Working Group External Trade, Ref: 2003-030-0814, October 2003 
[Eurelectric, 2003b] Security of Supply – A Key Issue for the European Electricity 
Industry,  Eurelectric Statement,  December 2003 
[Eurelectric, 2004a] Year 2003 Power Outages: Liberalisation is not to blame, 
Eurelectric Report Finds, Eurelectric Press Release, June 8, 2004, 
http://public.eurelectric.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=173  
 
[Eurelectric, 2004b] Power Outages in 2003, Task force Power Outages, June 2004  
 33
http://public.eurelectric.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=173  
 34
 [GRTN, 2003] Comunicazione ai dipendenti dell’Amministratore Delegato, P.Parcu, 
GRTN, 2003 
http://www.e-gazette.it/approfondimenti/Comunicato%20ai%20dipendenti.pdf 
[IEEE/CIGRE, 2004] Definition and Classification of  Power System Stability, 
IEEE/CIGRE Joint Task Force on Stability Terms and Definitions, IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, 1387- 1401, Vol. 19,   Issue 3,  Aug. 2004, ISSN: 0885-8950 
 [IAEW, 2001] Analysis of Electricity Network Capacities and Identification of 
Congestion, Final Report, by IAEW  and Consentec, Dec 2001, 
europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/publications 
[Kraftnät, 2003] The black-out in southern Sweden and eastern Denmark, 23 
September, 2003 October  2,  2003 
http://www.svk.se/web/Page.aspx?id=5687 
 
 [National Grid, 2003] Investigation Report into the Loss of Supply Incident affecting 
parts of South London at 18:20 on Thursday, 28 August 2003, Executive Summary. 
National Grid Transco. September 10, 2003. 
http://195.92.225.33/uk/library/documents/pdfs/London28082003.pdf 
[SFOE, 2003]  Report on the blackout in Italy on 28 September 200, Swiss Federal 
Office of Energy, November 2003 
http://www.energie-schweiz.ch/internet/02798/index.html?lang=en 
[Svenska Kraftnät, 2003] The black-out in southern Sweden and eastern Denmark, 23 
September, 2003,  October 2003  
http://www.svk.se/web/Page.aspx?id=5687 
[UCTE, 2003] UCTE  Operation Handbook  Policy 3,  
http://www.ucte.org/ohb/cur_status.asp 
[UCTE, 2004a] FINAL REPORT of the Investigation Committee on the 28 September 
2003 Blackout in Italy, UCTE Ad-hoc Investigation Committee, April 27, 2004 
http://www.ucte.org/pdf/News/20040427_UCTE_IC_Final_report.pdf 
 
[UCTE, 2004b] UCTE issues new system adequacy report 2003 with an overview of 
congestions on the UCTE interconnected system, UCTE Press Release  23 June 
2004, http://www.ucte.org/pdf/News/20040623_SAR2003.pdf 
[UCTE, 2004c] UCTE System Adequacy Forecast 2003 – 2005, UCTE Report, 
http://www.ucte.org/pdf/Publications/2003/UCTE_retrospect2003_final.pdf 
 [US-Canada, 2004]  Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United 
States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, U.S.-Canada Power System 
Outage Task Force, April 5, 2004, http://www.nerc.com/~filez/blackout.html 
 
